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The Hole Argument for Covariant Theories
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Abstract
The hole argument was developed by Einstein in 1913 while he was
searching for a relativistic theory of gravitation. Einstein used the lan-
guage of coordinate systems and coordinate invariance, rather than the
language of manifolds and diffeomorphism invariance. He formulated the
hole argument against covariant field equations and later found a way to
avoid it using coordinate language.
In this paper we shall use the invariant language of categories, mani-
folds and natural objects to give a coordinate-free description of the hole
argument and a way of avoiding it. Finally we shall point out some im-
portant implications of further extensions of the hole argument to sets
and relations for the problem of quantum gravity.
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1 The Hole Argument in General Relativity
1.1 The Original Hole Argument
In Einstein’s most detailed account of the hole argument [3], G(x) represents a
metric tensor field that satisfies the field equations in the x-coordinate system
and G′(x′) represents the same gravitational field in the x′-coordinate system.
Einstein realized that, if the field equations for the metric tensor are covariant,
then G′(x) must also represent a solution to these equations in the x-coordinate
system. He asked the following question: Do the metrics G(x) and G′(x) rep-
resent the same or distinct gravitational fields ? If they represent distinct grav-
itational fields, as Einstein originally assumed, then the hole argument showed
that no specification of the metric field outside of and on the boundary of a hole
( i.e. an open set of space-time) could uniquely determine the field inside the
hole.
Einstein posed the hole argument as a boundary-value problem. Hilbert
realised that it was more appropriate to formulate it as an initial value problem.1
If G(x) and G′(x) represent distinct solutions, then the specification of the G-
field and any finite number of its time derivatives on an initial hypersurface
t = 0 could determine the field uniquely of the initial hypersurface. These two
formulations are refered as the boundary-value and initial-value formulations of
the original hole argument. 2
We shall formulate the hole argument in manifold language. Our approach
will be global, in the sense that the whole base (space-time) manifold M and
(global) diffeomorphisms of M come into play, rather than working in a coordi-
nate patch and local coordinate transformations.
A general relativistic space-time is a 4-dimensional manifold M , together
with a Lorentz metric field g on M .3 This metric field represents not only
the chrono-geometrical structure of space-time, but also the potentials for the
inertio-gravitational field.4
Einstein’s field equations are covariant. This means that, if g is a solution of
Einstein’s equations, then all pull-backs metrics φ∗(g) obtained from g by the
mapping induced by diffeomorphisms φ on M also satisfy Einstein’s equations.
The question at the heart of the hole argument is the following.
Do all metrics φ∗(g) describe the same gravitational field? Einstein’s ulti-
mate answer was ”yes”. This assertion is what we call general covariance of
Einstein’s equations. 5
Let us suppose a space-time manifold (M, g) contains a hole, i.e., an open
space-time region H on which the metric field g is the only one present, so that
1For modern discussions of the implications of the diffeomorphism invariance for the Cauchy
problem in general relativity, see [5], [8].
2For more details and a historical review of the original hole argument see [23], [24].
3Time-orientability is an extra condition needed to formulate the global Cauchy problem
and global causal structure on space-time [5],[12].
4See e.g., [25], [27].
5Some authors define general covariance as what we call covariance, not making a clear
distinction between the two. See [24] for this distinction.
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inside H , the metric g obeys the (homogeneous) Einstein empty space-time
equations:
Ein(g) = Ric(g)−
1
2
gR(g) = 0 (1)
Given a solution g everywhere outside of and on the boundary of the hole
H , including all the normal derivatives of the metric up to any finite order
on that boundary, the metric field g inside H is still not determined uniquely
no matter how small the hole. The proof: Given any solution inside the hole
H , an unlimited number of other solutions can be generated from it by those
diffeomorphisms that reduce to the identity on M − H (and any number of
derivatives of which also reduce to the identity on the boundary), but differ
from the identity inside H . This brings us to the following contradiction (the
hole argument): No well-posed initial-value and/or boundary-value problem can
be posed for Einstein’s covariant equations6 So, such field equations would seem
not to be of much use, which is why Einstein (and then Hilbert) initially rejected
them. [26]
Einstein found a way to evade the hole argument using coordinate language.
Translated in the language of manifolds, one must assume that, at least inside
the hole H , the points of the manifold are not individuated independently of
the metric field. This means that space-time points have no inherent chrono-
geometrical or inertio-gravitational properties or relations that do not depend
on the presence of the metric tensor field. This implies that when we drag-along
the metric, we actually drag-along the physically individuating properties and
relations of the points. Thus, the pull-back metric does not differ physically from
the original one. It follows that the entire equivalence class of diffeomorphically-
related solutions to Einstein’s empty space-time field equations corresponds to
one inertio-gravitational field.
Put in other words, while the points of the manifold have an inherent quiddity
as elements of space-time, they lack haecceity 7 as individualized points of that
space-time (”events”) unless and until a particular metric field is specified. 8
Mathematically, we have M(M) the collection of all Lorentz metrics on a
space-time manifold M and Diff(M) the group of diffeomorphisms of M .
Diff(M) acts as a transformation group onM(M) by pulling-back metrics
on M(M): for all φ ∈ Diff(M) and g ∈ M(M) the action map is defined by
(φ, g) 7−→ φ∗(g).
For a fixed metric g, Og = {φ
∗(g)| φ ∈ Diff(M)} is the orbit through g.
Two metrics g1 and g2 are on the same orbit, if and only if φ
∗(g1) = g2 for some
φ ∈ Diff(M), i.e. g1 and g2 are isometric.
If g1 satisfies Einstein’s equations then g2 does. Two space-time solutions of
Einstein’s equations are considered to be physically equivalent if one is isometric
6The proof works also for any set of covariant equations
7For a discussion of quiddity and haecceity, see [30], p. 204 and [31]
8In the generic case (i.e. no symmetries present), the four non-vanishing invariants of the
Riemann tensor in empty space-times can be used to individuate the points of space-time.
See [24], pp. 155-156
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to the other.
The action of Diff(M) onM(M) partitionM(M) into (disjoint) isometry
classes of Lorentz metrics.
The space Q(M) of all isometry classes of space-time metrics on M is the
quotientM(M)/Diff(M). A physical space-time is therefore a point in Q(M).
The space Q(M) does not have a manifold structure, but in some cases it can
be shown that Q(M) forms a stratified manifold, with each strata consisting of
space-times with conjugate isometry groups. [9], [11] One of the reasons why
Q(M) does not have a manifold structure is because the isometry (symmetry)
group Hg = {φ ∈ Diff(M)|φ
∗(g) = g} is not trivial, if the metric g has
symmetries.
The projection map Π : M(M) −→ Q(M) identifies all isometric Lorentz
metrics to a single diffeomorphically-equivalence class. The image of Π(g) = [g]
represents the (unique) physical gravitational field defined by g.
1.2 The Hole Argument for Inhomogeneous Einstein’s Field
Equations
Let (M, g) be a space-time manifold. There may also be a collection ψ of
other tensor fields onM , representing non-gravitational fields and/or matter and
acting as sources of the metrical field in the inhomogeneous Einstein’s equations:
Ein(g) = Ric(g)−
1
2
gR(g) = T (g, ψ) (2)
In most cases the metric field appears on both left and right sides of Einstein
equations, so the space-time structure and the source fields in space-time consti-
tute a dynamical system, the equations of which can only be solved together.9
It is clear that a generalized version of the hole argument can also be ap-
plied to regions H of a space-time M , in which the inhomogeneous Einstein
equations hold, together with the set of dynamical equations obeyed by the non-
gravitational matter and fields( e.g. coupled Einstein-Maxwell or Einstein-Yang
Mills equations), provided this set of coupled gravitational and non-gravitational
field equations has the covariance property. (The generalization is straightfor-
ward and we leave the details to the reader.)
In order to avoid this version of the hole argument, we must assume that
space-time points of this region H are not individuated unless and until both
the gravitational and non-gravitational fields are specified in H . 10
Thus, an entire class of diffeomorphically-related solutions to the coupled
equations will correspond to one set of physical gravitational and non-gravitational
fields.
9For some exceptions, see [21]
10This does not imply that all of these fields are necessary for such individuation. The values
of four independent invariants of the metric fields will suffice to individuate the space-time
points in the generic case.
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2 The Hole Argument for Covariant Theories
We shall formulate the hole argument to theories that are covariant and give a
way of avoiding it.
2.1 Theory, Models, Covariance and General Covariance
At the level of physics 11, we have the following correlations between physical
concepts and mathematical structures:
A type of theory is correlated with the concept of a type of natural bundle
or gauge-natural bundle.
A natural bundle is defined as a covariant functor F of the category whose
objects are n-dimensional manifolds and whose morphisms are local diffeomor-
phisms into the category whose objects are fibred manifolds and whose mor-
phisms are fibre-preserving morphisms. We can think of F as a rule such that it
takes an n-dimensional manifold M into a fibered manifold (FM = E
pi
−→ M)
and a local diffeomorphism φ : M → N between two n-dim manifolds M and
N to a fiber-preserving morphism Fφ over φ.
A gauge-natural bundle can be defined similarly as a covariant functor F from
the category of principal bundles and principal fibre-preserving morphisms into
the category of fibred manifolds and fibre-preserving morphisms.
Notationally, we will make no distinction between the functor F, the fibered
manifold (E
pi
−→M) or the total space E, but one should keep in mind that F
is a functor, i.e. the object (E
pi
−→M) together with a class of automorphisms.
A mathematical model of a type of theory is correlated with a cross-section
of the natural bundle (E
pi
−→ M), or a class of gauge-equivalent cross sections
of the gauge-natural bundle.
A particular theory of given type is correlated with a rule for selecting a class
of cross-sections of the (gauge-)natural bundle, that is a class of mathematical
models of that type of theory.
For example, Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory is a rule for selecting the
class of cross-sections of the gauge-natural bundle of one-form fields that obey
the linear, gauge-invariant field equations derived from the Maxwell lagrangian.
On the other hand, Born-Infeld electrodynamic theory is a rule for selecting a
(different) class of cross-sections of the gauge natural bundle of one-form fields
that obey the non-linear, but gauge-invariant field equations derived from the
Born-Infeld lagrangian [1].
As these examples illustrate, for a theory based upon field equations derived
from the variation of a lagrangian, the selected cross-sections must satisfy some
set of differential equations for the type of geometric object.
So, in order to formulate the rule of selecting cross-sections one need to use
jet extensions of the configuration space [19]. But for our purposes we do not
need go to any further details about the rule for selecting cross-sections(see [6],
Chapter I, pp. 1-15 and [13], Chapter IV, pp. 124-125).
11or indeed any other natural science that has reached the level of abstraction, at which
mathematical structures may be usefully correlated with the concepts of this science
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General relativity can be formulated in terms of natural bundles. 12 A
mathematical model consists of a cross-section σ of the associated bundlle ΣPR
of the linear frames LM with standard fiber GL(4)/O(1, 3). [19]
In most cases the metric must satisfy some additional criteria, e.g. time-
like and/or null geodesic completeness. In general, the cross-sections σ can be
viewed as a maximal extension of a local cross-section subject to some additional
criteria.
The properties of local cross-sections of a fiber bundle may be expressed in
the language of sheaf theory. In terms of sheaves, giving a mathematical model
means giving a sheaf of local cross-sections of the fibered manifold (E
pi
→ M).
Alternatively, we can replace the sheaf of cross-sections by its corresponding
e´tale bundle (Eˆ
pˆi
→M) over M . [16]
The following question arises: Do all mathematically distinct models of a
physical theory necessarily correspond to physically distinct models of the the-
ory? As we shall see later, the hole argument concerns this question. The
answer to this question is the basis for the distinction between covariant and
generally covariant theories.
2.2 Background Independent vs Background Dependent
Theories
A background independent theory is a physical theory defined on a base manifold
M endowed with no extra structure, like geometry or fixed coordinates. If a
theory does include any such geometric structures, it is called a background-
dependent.
Examples of background dependent theories are all special-relativistic field
theories: the Minkowski metric and the (unique) symmetric inertial connection
compatible with it are background structures of these theories. More generally, a
field theory may be specified in a space-time with any given background Lorentz
metric and the corresponding (fixed) inertio-gravitational connection. One may
say that, in any such background-dependent theory, there is a kinematics that
is prior to and independent of the dynamics of the theory.
Examples of background independent theories are all general-relativistic
gravitational theories, obeying either the Einstein empty space-time equations
or a set of generally covariant coupled equations for a theory of matter fields
coupled to Einstein’s gravity.13 Both the Lorentz and the compatible inertio-
gravitational connection are among the dynamical variables, for which a solution
to the Einstein’s equations must be specified. One may say that, in a background
independent theory, there is no kinematics prior to and independent of the dy-
namics of the theory. It is to such background independent theories that the
12There two major ways to formulate general relativity; one uses only the metric and the
second order jet extension ([18], [5]) and the other, the metric and the connection and the
first order jet extension [8].
13In the case of a background independent classical theory, it seems natural to require
background independence in the corresponding quantum theory. See, for example [14] for a
discussion on background independence quantization of a scalar field
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hole argument applies.
2.3 The Hole Argument for Geometric Objects
Let us consider a particular theory T defined on a manifold M i.e. a rule for
selecting a set of models of a type of theory (FM = E
pi
→ M). In other words
we pick up a sheaf Γ(pi) of local cross-sections of pi.
If φ : M → M is an arbitrary diffeomorphism of the base manifold M ,
from the definition of a natural bundle follows that there is a uniquely defined
fibered manifold automorphism Fφ = Φ : E → E that projects over φ i.e., Φ is
diffeomorphism of E and pi ◦Φ = φ ◦ pi. Such a fibered manifold automorphism
(Φ, φ) can be used to transport local cross-sections of pi to local cross-sections
of pi:
If σ is a local cross-section of pi defined on a small open set Up around p ∈M ,
then φ∗σ defined by φ∗σ = Φ ◦ σ ◦ φ−1 is a new local cross-section of pi defined
on the open set Uq = φ(Up) around q = φ(p) ∈M , and called the carried-along
cross-section of σ by the fibered manifold automorphism (Φ, φ).
In functorial language, a diffeomorphism φ will induce functors in both di-
rections on the associated categories of sheaves of cross-sections on M . To each
sheaf of cross-sections Γ(pi), φ∗Γ(pi) is the direct image of the sheaf of cross-
sections Γ(pi) under the base diffeomorphism φ :M →M :
φ∗Γ(pi)(Uq) = Γ(pi)(Up), Up = φ
−1
M (Uq) (3)
If σ ∈ Γ(pi)(Up), then the carried-along cross-section φ
∗σ ∈ φ∗Γ(pi)(Uq).
In the case when E := TM is the tangent bundle over M , if φ : M → M
is an arbitrary diffeomorphism on M , then (φ∗, φM ) is a bundle isomorphism
of TM . So, if v is a vector field on M , then φ∗v is the carried along tangent
vector field. In the case of the metric field, φ∗g is the pulled-back metric of g by
the adjoint map of φ∗, where (φ
∗, φ) is a bundle isomorphism of the cotangent
bundle T ∗M .
A theory T is covariant if all the carried-along cross-sections φ∗σ of any
model σ in the theory are also models of the theory. Two models related by
such a local diffeomorphism are called diffeomorphically-equivalent. This re-
lation is clearly an equivalence relation and it divides all models of T into
diffeomorphically-equivalent classes of cross-sections on M .
A covariant theory T is called generally covariant if all the carried-along
cross-sections φ∗σ of any model σ in the theory represents the same physical
model.
It is the presence of non-dynamical individuating fields that prevents a co-
variant theory from being generally covariant, enabling one to distinguish be-
tween two models in the same equivalence class.14
The original hole argument generalized to the case of geometric objects trans-
lates in the possibility that the two models have physically identical properties.
14E.g., the color space manifold [23].
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Let T be a covariant theory on a base manifold M . Let H be a ”hole”,
which is an open set in M . Giving a model σ everywhere outside of and on the
boundary of the hole H , we cannot uniquely determine σ inside H no matter
how small the hole in M . From the covariance property, the hole argument
hinges on the answer to the following question:
Is it possible to pick out a unique model within an equivalence class by
specifying σ everywhere on M except on some open submanifold H ⊆M ?
The proof (that the answer to this question is negative) is analogous with that
in the original argument. Given a model σ onM , an unlimited number of other
solutions φ∗σ that are identical with σ on M −H and on the boundary of H ,
but differ inside H , can be generated from σ by those diffeomorphisms of M
that reduce to the identity onM −H on the boundary of H , but differ from the
identity inside H . Then σ and φ∗σ will be two different models that agree on
M −H but differ on H 15. In this case, no conditions imposed on σ on M −H
can serve to fix a unique model on H , no matter how small the hole is. The
only way to specify such a model uniquely, is to specify σ everywhere on M .
This is the hole argument for covariant theories, or rather against them.
If we postulate that each diffeomorphically-equivalent class of cross-sections
corresponds to one physical solution, then this requirement depends on the
assumption that the base points ofM are individuated exclusively by the model
(i.e., the class of cross-sections). In other words, the hole argument validity
depends crucially on the assumption that the distinction between the points
of the manifold (i.e., their haecceity), is independent of the specification of a
particular model of the theory T .
If the individuation of the points of M depends entirely on the model, then
we have no grounds for asserting that σ and φ∗σ represent different physi-
cal models. Given the lack of any model-independent distinction between the
points of the manifold, no distinction can be made between the models σ and
φ∗σ, so they represent the same physical model. Conversely, if σ and φ∗σ rep-
resents the same physical model for all base diffeomorphisms φ, then the hole
argument clearly fails. It follows that (as far as concerns the covariant theory
T under consideration) the points of M must be entirely unindividuated before
a model σ is introduced. All relevant distinctions between these points must
be consequences of the choice of the model σ, i.e. such a theory is generally
covariant.
Any background independent theory is general covariant. For background
independent theories (e.g., general relativity), the gauge freedom is the full dif-
feomorphism groupDiff(M) of the base manifoldM : under any arbitrary base
difeomorphism φ, the two mathematical models(M,σ) and (φ(M) = M,φ∗σ)
are physically indistinguishable. In coordinate language, the coordinates (or
physical components) of φ∗σ in the carried along frame are the same as the
coordinates of in the original frame. Informally this means that if everything is
carried along, nothing is changed. 16
15Of course, they belong to the same equivalence class, but they are not automatically
physically equivalent
16The two models (M,σ) and (M,φ∗σ) are elementarily equivalent models in the sense of
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The hole argument can only apply to background-independent theories. But
in between (full) background independence and (full) background dependence
(i.e., maximal symmetry group) there are fields with non-maximal symmetry
groups and non-trivial orbits. These case have to be treated by examining the
action of the full diffeomorphism group on the quotient space. [15]
If the theory is background dependent then the hole argument fails auto-
matically. A background space-time structure is sufficiently ”rigid” to prevent
the hole argument formulation. Specification of a solution outside of and on the
boundary of a hole H completely determines, indeed over-determines a solution
inside H . The class of physical fields on M must have the same symmetry as
the background structure. The class of all physical solutions to some set of field
equations thus falls into equivalence classes under the symmetry group of the
background metric. But, in the background-dependent case, the members of
each equivalence class can be physically distinguished from each other by those
further specifications that enable a distinction to be made between the points
on the orbits of the symmetry group.
In the case of space-times with a fixed background structure, the background
metric will have a symmetry group that may be a finite (up to ten) parameter
Lie group or the trivial group. We refer to the latter class of metrics as generic
space-times. The points of generic space-times are completely individuated (at
least locally) by the values of four invariants of the Riemann tensor. 17 If
there is a (non-zero) finite-parameter Lie group, some further specification of
the points on the orbit(s) of the group is needed in order to individuate them.
In the important case of special-relativistic field theories, the specification of
a fibration consisting of parallel timelike geodesic (”straight”) world-lines and
the corresponding orthogonal foliation of spacelike (”flat”) hyperplanes singles
out a particular inertial frame of reference in Minkowski space-time. Choice of
a spatial origin world line of the flibration and a temporal origin hyperplane
of the foliation, together with units of space and time, will then completely
individuate each point of Minkowksi space. The individuation of the points of
Minkowski space by means of choice of an inertial frame of reference, together
with a specification of spatial and temporal origins and units, enables us to
distinguish physically between members of each equivalence class of solutions
under the Poincare´ group. The Coulomb field of a charge q centered at the origin
of one inertial frame belongs to the same equivalence class as the Coulomb field
of a charge q centered at the origin of another inertial frame moving with velocity
v with respect to the first; but with respect to the first frame the two are quite
different physical fields.
model theory i.e., they share the same model-theoretic properties [7]. The truth values or the
probability of the corresponding assertions in each model will always be the same. That is for
every assertion about the model (M,σ), there is a one-to-one corresponding assertion about
models (M,φ∗σ).
17Even if the Ricci tensor vanishes, there will be four such non-vanishing invariants in the
generic case.
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2.4 Blocking the Formulation of the Hole Argument
For theories that are generally covariant, in order to avoid the formulation of this
generalized version of the hole argument we define a quotient space of classes of
models, so that each class of models corresponds to a (unique) physical model.
Einstein’s idea implies that if you drag-along the metric field, you drag all
the physical properties of space-time points along with them. Therefore, a
whole class of diffeomorphically related metrics corresponds to a unique physical
gravitational field.
Based on the construction of the quotient space of classes of models of a
theory, we obtain a 1:1 correspondence between a point in the quotient space
( i.e., a class of diffeomorphically related mathematical models) and a (unique)
physical model of the theory.
Let us consider a background independent theory T defined on a manifold
M i.e. a rule for selecting a set of cross-sections of a natural bundle (E
pi
→M).
Denote Γ(E;M) the collection of all cross-sections of pi. The group of
base diffeomorphisms Diff(M) acts as a transformation group on Γ(E;M)
by carrying-along cross-sections of pi: for all φ ∈ Diff(M) and σ ∈ Γ(E;M)
the action map is defined by (φ, σ) 7−→ φ∗(σ).
For a fixed model σ, Og = {φ
∗(g)| φ ∈ Diff(M)} is the orbit through σ.
Two cross-sections σ1 and σ2 are on the same orbit, if and only if φ
∗(σ1) = σ2
for some φ ∈ Diff(M). The action of Diff(M) on Γ(E;M) partition Γ(E;M)
into (disjoint) diffeomorphically equivalent classes of cross-sections.
The space Q(M) of all diffeomorphically-equivalent classes of cross-sections
on M is Γ(E;M)/Diff(M). A physical model corresponds to a point in this
quotient space.
The space Q(M) usually is singular and not a manifold and the infinite-
dimensional analysis is quite complicated. In fact, only if the action of the
Lie group is free i.e. all isotropy subgroups Hσ = {φ ∈ Diff(M)|φ
∗(σ) =
σ} are trivial, the resulting orbit space bears a manifold structure and (Π :
Γ(E;M) −→ Q(M)) forms a principal fiber bundle. More often, the orbit
space Q(M) admits a stratification into manifolds. The existence of such a
stratification is usually shown by proving the existence of slices at every point
for the group action. 18
The projection map Π : Γ(E;M) −→ Q(M) identifies all diffeomorphically-
equivalent models to a single diffeomorphically-equivalence class. The image of
Π(σ) = [σ] represents the physical model defined by σ.
3 Conclusion
In our approach we start with a fibered manifold representing the metric and
perhaps other physical fields, rather than the base manifold. This way it be-
comes difficult to forget that, in general relativity, space-time is no more than
18For details about the slice theorem, see [17]
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“a structural quality of the field.” This agrees with one of Einstein’s intuitions
about general relativity:
On the basis of the general theory of relativity, space as opposed
to what fills space ... has no separate existence If we imagine the
gravitational field, i.e., the functions gik to be removed, there does
not remain a space of the type (of special relativity), but absolutely
nothing, and also not topological space. ... There is no such thing
as an empty space, i.e., a space without field. Space-time does not
claim existence on its own, but only as a structural quality of the
field. (Albert Einstein ) [22], pp. 1860, [4], pp. 155.
In a backgound independent theory ( e.g. general-relativistic theories), if
we start from some natural bundle, the base points may be characterized as
such independently of the particular relations in which they stand; but they are
entirely individuated in terms of the relational structure given by cross-sections
of some fibered manifold.
In our invariant formulation, the hole argument can be easily further gen-
eralized to the case of sets and relation with some important implications to
problems in quantum gravity. [10]. Elementary particles are similarly individ-
uated by their position in a relational structure and this suggests the following
viewpoint: Since the basic building blocks of any model of the universe, the
elementary particles and the points of space-time, are individuated entirely in
terms of the relational structures in which they are embedded, only ”higher-
level” entities constructed from these building blocks can be individuated inde-
pendently. Therefore, the following principle of generalized covariance should be
a requirement on any fundamental theory: The theory should be invariant under
all permutations of the basic elements, out of which the theory is constructed.
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